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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
ROBERT WAYNE GLEASON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIE,F OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE iCA:SE 
Case No. 
10289 
Appellant appeals from a conviction of the crime of 
rape in violation of Section 76-53-15(3), Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. 
DISPOSI1T1ION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried upon jury trial for the crime 
of rape in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 17th day of July, 
1964. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the ap-
pellant was committed to the Utah State Prison. The 
• 
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appellant has prosecuted this appeal from the lower 
court's judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the appellant's con. 
viction by the trial court should be affirmed. 
STkTEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of 
facts. 
On April 14, 1963, at 10 :30 p.m., Miss Fawn Dotson 
was standing on the corner of 13th South and State 
Street in Salt Lake City, waiting for a bus (R. 72). She 
observed the appellant, Robert Wayne Gleason, walk 
across the street from 13th South toward her. The ap· 
pellant approached Miss Dotson, walked behind her and 
asked her if the bus had left yet (R. 77). She indicated 
that it had not and after a car had stopped, and the occu· 
pant had asked the appellant a question and left, the 
appellant put a pistol against the back of Miss Dotson 
and told her that if she didn't follow him, he would kill 
her. She tried to jerk away from him and run, but he 
grabbed her arm, held her, and told her that if she did 
anything like that again, he would kill her (R. 78). He 
forced her down to an alley where she started to screarn 
and struck him with her purse. Her purse broke open 
and several items fell on the ground (R. 79). There w~ 
a truck with a meat sign on it in the alley (R. 79) . 
• 
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The appellant then threw Miss Dotson to the ground, 
hit }in, choked lier, and tore her clothing from her body 
(H. SU). 'l'liereafter, he raped her, making complete pen-
ftration (R. 81). Subsequently, the appellant fled and 
Mis::: Dotson grabbed some of her clothing and returned 
to her boy friend's house, where the police were called 
(R. 8~). 
A polie1~ inspection of the area of the attack revealed 
that part of Miss Dotson's clothing was still at the scene 
and items which had fall en from her purse (R. 94, 96). 
Miss Dotson was taken to the Salt Lake County Hospital, 
11-here sh(~ was examined and found to have abrasions, 
bruises and scrakh<'s on the neck, breasts and thighs (R. 
hi, G.~). Dr. David A. Hansen performed a routine pelvic 
examination and removed live, viable sperm (R. 70). He 
testified that the life of such sperm would be between 
2-1: and 4-8 hours (R. 70). Miss Dotson testified at trial 
that she had not had intercourse for at least two days 
(R. 81). 
Snb~wquently, Miss Dotson identified the appell-
ant's pirture from police mug shots and further identified 
thl- appellant at a police lineup (R. 83, 100, 103). There-
ufter, the police recovered pants from the defendant's 
wife -\\"hich resembled the pants Miss Dotson said her 
ns:c:ailant Wa8 wearing. They contained mud on the side 
::ind lrnres which resembled that found at the scene of 
t li P e rime (It 111, 112). 
NuhE;t~quent to the appellant's arrest and charge for 
i)i,, cri.J11t>, lw was admitted to the Utah State Hospital 
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for psychiatric examination. He remained there for a 
period of approximately one year before he was brought 
to trial (R. 15). At the time of the trial, the appellant 
did not take the stand and offered no evidence in his 
behalf except the testimony of two psychiatrists. Dr. 
Richard C. Gilmore testified that he observed the ap-
pellant at the State Hospital on June 10, 1963. At that 
time the appellant appeared psychotic, suffering from an 
acute schizophrenic reaction of a paranoid type (R. 119
1 
120). He testified that he could not determine whether 
the appellant suffered from any mental disease on April 
14, 1963, at the time the crime was committed. He could , 
not say whether at that time of the crime the appellant 
suffered from any mental disease or defect or would be 
legally insane (R. 120, 123, 125). He indicated that it 
was possible that the arrest of the appellant could have 
brought on his psychotic condition (R. 125). Dr. Roger 
S.. Kiger, a psychiatrist at the Utah State Hospital, 
testified that he observed the appellant from June 101 
1963, to May 7, 1964, and during that time, the appel-
lant's condition would vary from psychotic to normal. 
He testified that he could not determine or give an opin-
ion as to the appellant's mental condition on April 14, 
1963, nor could he determine whether at that time the 
appellant knew the difference between right and wrong, 
the nature of the act he committed, or could resist from 
committing the act (R. 134, 135). He testified that ap-
pellant's condition could change at the "snap of a finger" 
(R. 136). He further indicated that at the time the ap-
pellant was admitted to the State Hospital, he diagnosed 
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his condition as acute schizophrenic reaction, paranoid 
type (R. 129), but that the appellant admitted that he 
had been feigning mental illness and that he felt there 
was some attempt on the part of appellant to feign men-
tal illness, but that his diagnosis was accurate (R. 136). 
The trial court refused to submit the question of 
appt>llant 's insanity to the jury on the grounds that the 
evidence of insanity was too remote and speculative. 
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a 
vt>rdict of guilty to the crime of rape. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF INSANITY TO THE 
.JURY. 
The appellant contends that the trial court should 
have submitted the issue of insanity to the jury. The 
evidenee in this regard shows that the crime was com-
mitted on or about April 14, 1963. On June 10, 1963, 
the appellant was examined by a psychiatrist at the 
State Mental Hospital. .According to the two psychia-
trists that testified, when they saw the appellant on June 
10, 1963, he was suffering from an acute schizophrenic 
reaction, paranoid type (R. 120, 129). In response to 
questions concerning the appellant's condition on the 
day the crime was committed, Dr. Richard C. Gilmore 
t.,stified: 
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"Q. Could you, from your examination, arrive at 
a diagnosis as to his mental condition on 0; 
about the 14th day of April, 19631 
A. I could not. 
Q. Now, Doctor, the description that you have 
given to us of the defendant, Mr. Gleason do 
these conditions develop, usually, over-ni~ht! 
A. I think this is within the realm of possibility. 
Q. As a general rule, then, Doctor, may we as-
sume that his condition arises from various 
things over a period of time 1 
MR. BANKS: I will object to that as a 
leading question, and also an asswnption, 
rather than his opinion. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained; 
you may restate your question. 
Q. Would it be your opinion, Doctor, that con-
ditions such as Mr. Gleason's would develop 
over a period of time¥ 
A. It is my opinion that this would be possible." 
(R. 120, 121.) 
On cross examination, he testified: 
"Q. Did he. Now, at that time, could you m~e 
a determination as to what his mental condi· 
tion was on or about April 14, of 1964, based 
on your examination¥ 
A. I could not. 
Q. And, therefore, based on your examinailtio
1
n
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. 
you couldn't tell whether or not, on Apr' ' 
7 
he could tell the difference between right and 
wrong, both legally and morally, could you Y 
A. I could not, sir. 
Q. Based on your examination, you couldn't tell 
whether or not, on April 14, 1963, he would 
know the nature of the acts of 'intercourse' 
and 'forcible intercourse,' would you 1 
A. I could not testify to this, sir. 
Q. And, at that particular time, you couldn't tell 
whether or not, from your examination, 
whether or not, on April 14, that he had a 
diseased mind to such an extent that it would 
prevent him from controlling his impulses? 
A. I could not say so. 
• • • 
Q. ·would a person with this diagnosis - person 
with this diagnosis - on occasion that is, 
does know the difference between right and 
wrong - legally and morally; isn't that cor,.. 
rect? 
A. This is possible, yes. 
Q. It happens all the time, doesn't iU 
A. I have observed this in this type of person-
abty. 
Q. And this type of individual, on a given oc-
casion, also, would know the nature of his 
acts? 
A. Yes, sir. 
8 
Q. And, also, on such an occasion, he would know 
the nature of having sexual intercourse; isn't 
that true? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, on occasions, individual of this tYPe 
would also know the significance of forcing 
intercourse with a person; isn't that correct! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, on such occasions, even though a person 
of this nature might have a diseased mind, he 
would be able to control his impulses; isn't 
that correct Y 
A. Would you restate that, please? 
Q. I say on such occasions-withdraw that ques-
tion; rephrase it: On occasions, a person 
with the diagnosis and with this same diag-
nosis, would be able to control their impulses1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, the mere fact that a person is mentally 
ill and hospitalized, Doctor, doesn't mean that 
he doesn't know what he is doing, does itT 
A. In the broad, general term of 'mental illness/ 
this is true; yes, sir. 
• • • 
Q. Well, conditions can vary from day to day of 
a particular patient; isn't that trueY 
A. Yes, sir." 
Dr. Gilmore further testified that the incident of 
being arrested might be sufficient to touch off appel-
lant's condition (R. 126). 
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Dr. Roger S. Kiger testified that he was the ap-
pellan t's physician at the State Hospital from June 10, 
1963, to May 7, 1964. He testif ed on direct examination: 
"Q. Now, based upon your examination, were you 
able to form an opinion or to arrive at a diag-
nosis as to Mr. Gleason's mental condition on 
April 14, 1963? 
A. I wasn't." 
On cross examination he testified that when he first 
examined the appellant on the 10th of June, 1963, he was 
irrational, even though he was feigning symptoms and 
was unreliabl<~ ( R. 130-137). He further testified: 
"Q. And, from none of your examination or diag-
no::::is, test::::, have you been able to form an 
opinion as to this individual, as to whether 
or not he morally or legally knew the differ-
ence between right and wrong as of April 
14th of 1963, have you? 
A. I could not form an opinion. 
Q. And, with the same background, you have 
never been able to form an opinion as to 
whether or not, as of April 14th of 1963, he 
did know the nature of the acts of inter-
course ; is that correct? 
A. I would not know. 
Q. Or forcing someone to have an act of inter-
course with him; is that correct? 
A. Would you repeat the last part? 
Q. Yes; it is - it is a continuation of your prior 
answer. 
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A. That he would lmow? 
Q. That - yes, that he would lrn.ow the nature 
of forcing someone to having intercourse with 
him? 
A. As of April 14th? 
Q. As of April 14th? 
A. I have never been in a position to know. 
Q. And, as far as you lmow, he - you don't 
know whether or not he could control his im. 
pulses on April 14th, or not control them? 
A. I would not lrn.ow." 
(R. 133, 134.) 
'The doctor indicated that most of the time that ap-
pellant was committed to the State Hospital, he lrnew 
the difference between right and wrong, lmew the nature 
of his acts, and was capable of controlling his impulses. 
In response to how fast the appellant's mental condition 
could change, Dr. Kiger responded to the District At· 
torney's questions as follows : 
"Q. Knowing what you do about this individual 
and - isn't it true that individual could take 
a flip-flop and be in as bad a condition as he 
was on June 10 of 1963? 
A. By a definition of 'flip-flop,' in my mind, ther. 
the snap of the finger, I would say, yes, he 
could. 
Q. But he could revert back to that condition T 
A. Yes." 
11 
1 R l3li.) 
i\ 0 L·vidPnce of any kind was offered by the appellant 
frnin 11 i:-' acquaintances or relatives to the effect that 
on tlt<' date the offense was conunitted, the appellant 
eould not appreciate the nature of his acts, did not know 
the di [fl>rence between right and wrong, and could not 
aJhere to the right. Nothing in the testimony of the 
prcsecutrLx was to the effect that the appellant would 
haVl' cmmnitted the act even in the presence of deterring 
autltorit)·. None of the police officers associated with 
aw<·llant at the time of his apprehension testified to 
noticing app(~llant exhibit any symptoms of insanity. The 
appellant apparently attempted to commit the act in 
an an•a where he would be least likely to be detected as 
di~tinct from the area where he first approached the 
prosu~utrix. 
Although there is some evidence that appellant had 
p:-;yehiatric treatment approximately one year to a year 
and a half prior to the incident (R. 13), there is no show-
ing that this psychiatric treatment was in any way re-
lated to the present incident or that at any time in the 
past, vrior to the commission of the crime, had the appel-
lant's conilition been indicative of legal insanity. There 
i~ not one scintilla of evidence to indicate the appellant's 
eondition at the time the crime was committed. It is well 
t·~tahlished that in this State, in order for a defendant 
to bP t>:x:cused from criminal misconduct, it must appear 
that at the time the crime was committed, either (1) the 
appellant did not know the nature of the act he was 
r·nmmitting, or (2) he did not know that the act was 
12 
wrong, or (3) he could not control his impulses. State i1, 
Poulson, 14 U.2d 213, 381 P.2d 93 (1963); State v. Kirk-
ham, 7 Utah 2d 108, 319 P.2d 859 (1958). 
It is the general rule at common law that the mental 
impairment of any defendant must appear to have existed 
at the time the crime was committed. Williams, Criminal 
Law, 2d Edition, The General Part, page 443. It is settled 
that the evidence of any diminished faculty of an accused 
must be related to the time of the crime. Wigmore, Evi 
dence, 3rd Edition, Sec. 931. 
It is well established that although the prosecution 
bears the overall burden of proving a defendant's guilt, 
it is presumed that a defendant in any criminal case is 
sane and the burden of proof of going forward with 
evidence to overcome the presumption rests upon the 
defendant. In Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Vol. 1, 12th 
Ed., Sec. 28, it is stated: 
"* * * The prosecution has the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant had the capacity to commit 
the crime charged, but it may initially rely on the 
presumption of sanity. That is, since everyone is 
rebuttably presumed sane, it will be assumed that 
the defendant has sufficient capacity, and the 
burden is upon him to prove that he is insane." 
In State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 Pac. 641 (190!1). 
this court observed: 
"* * * No doubt the presumption of sanity in 
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, make~ 
prima facie case in favor of sanity. It is, however .. 
a presumption of fact merely, and prevails unless 
• 
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overcome by countervailing proof. In this juris-
diction the burden of overcoming this preswnption 
rests primarily upon the defendant. He is re-
qi~irr;d to overthrow it, by a preponderance of the 
evidence offered in the case upon the subject. 
( F~mphasis added.) 
Suh~e4uently, in State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 
134 Pac. G32 (1913), the court had before it a conviction 
of the appellant for the crime of murder in the first 
degree. In affirming the judgment, the court held that 
tlH~ evidence presented was not sufficient to warrant an 
in:'itrnction to the jury on the issue of insanity and, con-
::leqm·ntly, no error from imperfect instructions could be 
claimed.1 The evidence in theM ewhinney case was sub-
stantially stronger than the evidence in the instant case 
to the extent that it was directed to the condition of the 
rlefrndant at the time the crime was actually committed. 
In the instant case where the evidence would be specula-
tive and remote, and where the jury had before it no 
evidence as to the appellant's condition at the time the 
crime was committed, it can hardly be said that the ap-
pellant carried his burden of going forward with suffi-
e1ent evidence to indicate his insanity at the time of 
trial. In State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931), 
this court ruled : 
"* * '* Until evidence is offered and received 
at tlrn trial which tends to show that the defen-
dant was insane at the time of the alleged crime, 
1In State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931), the court charac-
tenz<>d the Mewhinney case as standing for the proposition: "That 
!here was not sufficient evidence to entitle the defendant to go to the 
Jury on the question of insanity." loc. sit. 593. 
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the state may rely upon the presumption of sanity 
and need not of fer evidence to establish that fa.et. 
In the absence of evidence, sanity is assumed to 
exist without evidence of its existence." (Em. 
phasis added.) 
Although the court indicated that a defendant's burdPn 
has been met when some evidence of insanity is intro. 
duced, it noted that the evidence must "tend to show the 
accused was insane at the time of the alleged offense." 
There is no evidence of any kind tending to show 
insanity at the time of the offense in the instant case. 
The psychiatric testimony was neutral and, at least, one 
psychiatrist indicated that the appellant's condition could 
have been brought about by his arrest, and, further, av 
pellant's condition could change with the "snap of a 
finger." 
The appellant argues, however, that since there is 
some evidence that, within a period of 55 days after the 
crime, the appellant was insane, the jury could infer 
therefrom that the appellant was insane at the time thP 
crime was committed. This argument overlooks two sali-
ent facts. First, the condition which the appellant wai 
suffering from at the time he was first examined by the 
doctors was a fluctuating one which could vary instan· 
taneously. Second, appellant's involvement, suuseqmnt 
to the commission of the crime, could have been respon· 
sible for the later condition. The appellant's argument 
is analogous to the presumption of continuing insanity. 
There is a rule of law that where it is shown that an 
individual is insane, it will be presumed that he continur'1 
15 
to ri•main insane. 27 A.L.R.2d 121. In the instant case, 
the appellant urges that some form of presumption that 
the, appellant was insane at the time the offense was 
committed can be indulged from the fact that he was 
insane at some time subsequent to the offense. However, 
the cases are virutally unanimous that no such presump-
tion of e.ontinning insanity, even were it applicable to 
this fad situation, arises where the nature of the mental 
illnPss is spaRmodic. Thus, in 27 A.L.R.2d 121, at page 
124, it is observed: 
'' l\f o~t of the courts which have, in criminal 
caRPs, recognized that presumption of continuing 
insanity arises from proof that the accused was, 
at a time earlier than that under investigation, 
afflicted with insanity, have held that this pre-
sumption arises only where the earlier insanity 
shown by the evidence was permanent, chronic, 
or of a continuing nature, and not merely tem-
porary or spasmodic." 
Further, at page 135, it is stated: 
"There is some basis (in the legal if not the 
medical books) for drawing a distinction between 
spells of insanity which are purely temporary or 
spa~m1odic in nature, and those forms of insanity 
where the affliction, while permanent and contin-
uing, is cyclic in nature, so that the person af-
foded is subject to recurrent periods of insanity 
se1iarated by lucid intervals. In a number of cases 
it has been said that upon a showing that the de-
fendant's prior insanity was interrupted by lucid 
intervals, no presumption of continuing insanity 
arisPs, and the burden is upon the accused to show 
16 
his insanity at the time of committing the offense 
charged.'' 
It is apparent, therefore, that there is no legal basis 
for the appellant's contention that he met his burden of 
going forward with the evidence by a showing of insanity 
subsequent to the event. This evidence was substantially 
remote to the time in question.2 Since it was remote 
and speculative, it was well within the province of the 
trial judge not to present the matter to the jury. State 
v. Schuman, 151 Kan. 749, 100 P.2d 706 (1940); 22 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law, Sec. 639. 
It is settled that it is not error for a court to fail to 
give an instruction on insanity where the evidence is in. 
sufficient to raise the issue for jury consideration. People 
v. C111nningham, 245 P.2d 450 (Calif. 1926); People v. 
Francis, 38 Calif. 183; United States v. Wilson, 9 U.S.C.-
M.A. 60, 25 C.M.R. 322 ( 1958). 
In United States v. Regan, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 323, 27 
C.M.R. 397 (1959), the appellant was convicted of the 
crime of assault with a deadly weapon and the inten· 
tional infliction of grevious bodily harm. Various wit· 
nesses testified that the appellant's conduct was strange, 
disturbed and sickly at the time of the commission of the 
crime. The court ruled the evidence insufficient to war· 
rant an instruction on insanity. 
It is submitted that the court did not err in not in· 
structing the jury on the issue of insanity where there 
2See Moore v_ D_ & R.G.W. Ry., 4 U.2d 255, 292 P.2d 849, wher~ ~ 
court indicated that mere medical possibilities do not raise suff1cien 
evidence for jury consideration. 
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was not a scintilla of evidence as to the appellant's condi-
tion at the time the crime was committed. 
Although the appellant does not raise the issue as 
a point of error in his brief, he does note and challenge 
the court's failure to give an instruction to the effect 
that every criminal offense requires a union of act and 
intent. The failure to give such an instruction could 
hardly have prejudiced the appellant. The jury was ex-
pressly instructed by the Court's Instructions No. 8 and 
No. 11 as to the requirement that the accused must will-
fully have committed the act. Rape is an offense which 
does not require a specific intent but just a general intent 
to conunit the act. Walden v. State, 178 Tenn. 71, 156 
S.W.2d 305 ( 1941). Since the jury was otherwise ap-
praised of the essential elements of the crime, the in-
struction on the union of act and intent was superfluous 
and unnecessary. Further, since the point has not been 
specifically raised on appeal, it is not properly before 
the court. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON 
THE OFFENSE OF ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO 
COMMIT RAPE, BECAUSE: 
(a) THE REQUEST FOR SUCH AN INSTRUC-
TION WAS NOT TIMELY., AND 
(b) THE EVIDENCE DID NOT RAISE THE 
ISSUE AS TO ANY LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE. 
(a) At the time of trial the appellant requested an 
mstruction on the question of assault with intent to com-
18 
mit rape (R. 138). ·The court refused such an instruc-
tion, noting that the question of request for instructioni 
had been considered the previous evening and the only 
request made at that time was for an instruction on as. 
sault and battery. It is apparent, therefore, that the ap-
pellant did not make a timely request in accordance with 
local court rules and cannot object to the failure of the 
court to give the instruction as requested. People u. 
Pearson, 150 Calif. App.2d 811, 311 P.2d 142; People t'. 
Northum, 115 Calif. App. 2d 606, 252 P.2d 686. 
(b) The evidence in the instant case clearly showi 
that an assault took place on the person of Fawn Dotson. 
The prosecutrix testified, without contradiction, that the 
appellant effected penetration. Further, upon examina-
tion by a treating physician at the Salt Lake County Hos-
pital, viable sperm was removed from the vaginal vaul! 
of the prosecutrix. No evidence of any kind was intro-
duced to dispute the fact of penetration or to weaken 
the contention that the crime of rape had in fact been 
consummated. The appellant himself remained silent on 
the issue of the consummation of the crime. There wa' 
no evidence to rebut the statement of the prosecutrix or 
to raise any factual contest that the crime of rape itself 
had not been committed. Under these circumstances, it 
is clear that no issue as to the lesser included offemr 
was raised. 
It is admitted that assault with intent to comn1it 
rape is lesser included within the crime of rape (Bini 
v. Blythe, 20 Utah 378, 58 Pac. 1108), and although 1 
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r,onvirtion of the lesser offense in the face of overwhelm-
ing evidence of the greater offense would stand because 
thP defendant could not be harmed, still, there is no re-
quirenwnt that a jury be instructed on lesser offenses 
unless a n·asonable basis for the instruction appears 
from tlw evidence. In State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215 
Pac. 531 (1923), this court stated: 
"It is a well-settled rule that instructions as 
to lower grades of the offenses charged should 
be given when warranted by the evidence. It is 
equally well settled that in a criminal prosecution 
error cannot be predicated on the omission of the 
trial court to instruct as to lesser grades of the 
offense charged where there is no evidence to re-
duce the offense to a lesser grade. 1 Blashfield, 
Instructions to Juries (2d Ed.) §408." 
In State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 (1929), this 
court again noted: 
"It is a well settled rule that instructions as 
to lower grades of the offense charged should be 
given when warranted by the evidence. It is equal-
ly well settled that in a criminal prosecution error 
cannot be predicated on the omission of the trial 
court to instruct as to lesser grades of the of-
fense charged, where there is no evidence to re-
duce the offense to a lesser grade." 
In the same case, .Justice Straup, concurring, noted: 
"I concur in the result. I concur in the gen-
eral statement as announced in some of the texts 
and cases that when there is no evidence to sup-
Jinrt a conviction of a lesser offense, a court is not 
20 
required to submit it to a jury, and concur in the 
statement in the prevailing opinion that instruc. 
tions as to lower grades of a charged offense, 
when embraced and included therein, should be 
given when warranted by evidence." 
More recently, in State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 
P.2d 618 (1955), this court again reiterated the doctrine 
that before a failure to instruct on a lesser included of-
fense can be claimed as error, there must be "evidence 
from which reasonable persons could conclude that the 
lesser offense was committed." Therefore, unless there 
was evidence of record that would allow "reasonable per-
sons" to find that some lesser offense, such as assault 
wi'th the intent to commit rape, was committed, the court 
did not err in refusing to so instruct. 
In People v. Abeyta, 134 Colo. 441, 305 P.2d 1063 
(1957), the Colorado Supreme Court noted that the only 
evidence be~ore the court in a forcible rape case showed 
that the crime in fact had been committed. It ruled that 
under such circumstances the failure to submit the lesser 
included offense of assault with intent to commit rape 
could in no way prejudice the defendant. The court ruled: 
"• • • Under the record as made the defen· ' . dants were guilty of forcible rape or nothing at 
all. 1They contended they had no contact with the 
prosecutrix, and were, as above stated, in Pueblo, 
Colorado. The only evidence before the jury ~as 
that a rape had been committed, and we per~ve 
no error in the refusal of the trial court to give 
defendants' tendered Instruction No. 1." 
• 
l· 
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Jn People v. Cardaropali, 115 Calif. App.2d 235, 251 
P.2d 692 ( 1953), the court observed: 
"• • • The evidence disclosed a rape and not 
a mere attempt. While the defendant struck the 
complaining witness this was incidental to the 
commission of the rape, and it is inconceivable 
that the jury could have believed that part of the 
complaining witness' testimony without believing 
the rest of it. The defendant relied entirely on 
the contention that he was not there, and having 
rested his case on that ground he is in no position 
to complain that a miscarriage of justice resulted 
from any failure to instruct the jury with respect 
to the inclusion of a lesser offense. People v. 
Meichtry, 37 Cal.2d 385, 231 P.2d 847; People v. 
Ross, 89 Cal.App. 132, 264 P. 314. There was no 
evidence which would tend to reduce the offense 
from that charged in the information, the defense 
offered no evidence contradictory to that offered 
by the prosecution in this regard, and neither 
error nor prejudice appears from the court's fail-
ure to give such an instruction on its own motion." 
In State v. Brown, 16 U.2d 57, 395 P.2d 727 (1964), 
the appellant was convicted of the crime of rape. The 
evidence of the actual commission of the crime of rape 
was less solid than that now before the court. On appeal 
it was argued that the trial court erred in not giving an 
instruction on the lesser included offense of assault with 
intent to commit rape (See Brief of Respondent, Gase 
No. 10067). The court, in passing upon the case on ap-
peal, summarily rejected the argument without discus-
sion, finding the issue was unmeritorious. 
22 
It is apparent, therefore, that the issue in the instant 
case raises no basis for relief on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts in the instant case clearly show the com. 
mission of the crime of rape. The appellant's contention 
that the trial court should have instructed the jury on 
the lesser included offense is at best frivolous. The ar-
gument that the jury should have been allowed to specu-
late as to the appellant's mental condition at the time 
of the commission of the offense has no valid founda-
tion in law or in fact. There was not a scintilla of evi-
dence except mere speculation alone that the accused 
was insane at the time of the commission of the instant 
offense. The record is devoid of evidence going to the 
elements of legal insanity at the time the offense was 
committed. Further, the psychiatric testimony does not 
demonstrate any positive evidence that the accused was 
insane at the time of the commission of the offense suf-
ficient to overcome the presumption of insanity. 
The trial court acted properly in not leaving to the 
jury a matter which had only conjecture to support it. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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